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Fifty-four hypnotizable and 49 unhypnotizable simulating subjects were age regressed 
to age five and asked to write the sentence “I am participating in a psychological experi-
ment” embedded in either “standard” suggestions for regression or in the context of a 
suggested dream.  As predicted, hypnotizable subjects were sensitive to the context ma-
nipulation (i.e., dream vs. standard), evidencing more correct or “adult” spelling (“trance 
logic”) during age regression when the dream context encouraged a melding of fantasy 
and reality.  Simulators’ performance was stable across conditions.  Consistent with the 
hypothesis that incomplete responding is at the heart of incongruous spelling during age 
regression, the hypnotizable and simulating subjects who evinced the least compelling 
experiences of age regression were the most likely to spell “adult” words correctly (exhibit 
“trance logic”).  Finally, none of the 31 subjects whose handwriting was rated as “child-
like and primitive” spelled the word “psychological” correctly, providing clear evidence 
that subjects who were the most responsive to the age regression suggestion fail to exhibit 
trance logic.  
Introduction
Since the time of Mesmer, hypnosis has featured 
prominently as a method for altering sensations, 
emotions, memories, and thoughts.  Indeed, 
hypnosis can engender dramatic changes in con-
sciousness produced by suggestions for hallucina-
tions, amnesia, changes in motor responses, and 
alterations in pain and other physiological re-
sponses (see Lynn & Kirsch, 2006).  Not surpris-
ingly, clinicians have capitalized on the potential 
of hypnotic interventions to promote self-regula-
tion in treating a variety of psychological disor-
ders (e.g., anxiety, somatoform disorders; Lynn, 
Rhue, & Kirsch, 2010).  
 The profound changes in subjective experi-
ences that sometimes follow suggestions beg ex-
planation and have prompted clinicians and re-
searchers to proffer diverse accounts of hypnotic 
phenomena, including the idea that hypnosis 
produces a special “state” of consciousness.  In his 
classic 1959 paper, Orne concluded that one of the 
principal features of the hypnotic state is the abil-
ity to tolerate logical inconsistencies that would 
be disturbing in the wake state (p. 297).  Orne 
defined trance logic as the “ability of the subject 
to mix freely his perceptions derived from real-
ity with those that stem from imagination and are 
perceived as hallucinations…” and that “ignores 
everyday logic…” without any attempt to satisfy 
a need for logical consistency (p. 295).  The more 
contemporary literature is replete with references 
to trance logic as a defining or important feature of 
hypnosis or the hypnotizable person (e.g., Beshai, 
2004; Evans, 2001; Karlin, 2007; Kroger & Yapko, 
2007; Spiegel & Spiegel, 2004), although the cen-
tral role of trance logic as a distinctive feature of 
hypnosis is far from universally accepted.
Age regressed participants apparently do not 
literally (or accurately) relive the events of child-
hood (see Nash, 1987).  Still, some age regressed 
individuals do behave incongruously, which has 
been taken as evidence of trance logic.  The in-
congruous behavior most frequently examined in 
age regression studies is that of the regressed sub-
ject correctly spelling words that are beyond the 
cognitive abilities of a normal child at the target 
age.  Whereas a number of investigations (Perry 
& Walsh, 1978; Nogrady, McConkey, Laurence, 
& Perry, 1983; Spanos, deGroot, Tiller, Weekes, 
& Bertrand, 1985) have reported significant dif-
ferences between hypnotizable and simulating 
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(i.e.,  unhypnotizable role playing) participants, 
other investigations have not reported signifi-
cantly more incongruous writing or incongruous 
responding in response to other trance logic tasks, 
for hypnotic “reals” than for simulators (Peters, 
1973; Stanley, et al., 1986) or imagining (non-
hypnotized) participants (see Lynn & Rhue, 1991; 
McConkey, Bryant, Bibb, & Kihlstrom, 1991). 
The current study tests an account of incon-
gruous responding that rests on the idea that what 
some researchers have considered to represent 
logical incongruity instead represents “incom-
plete responding” (Spanos, 1986; Stanley et al., 
1986) in both hypnotized and imagining partici-
pants.  This hypothesis holds that the correct spell-
ing of “adult” words (e.g., “psychological”) during 
age regression, hypnotic or otherwise, is associ-
ated with incomplete role involvement in the ex-
perience of being a child.  Even very hypnotizable 
and imaginative participants find it difficult to ex-
perience complete subjective involvement in de-
manding test suggestions such as hallucinating a 
person or object (e.g., Rhue & Lynn, 1987; Spanos, 
Mullens, & Rivers, 1979; Spanos et al., 1985; 
Spanos & Radtke, 1982; Wagstaff, Toner, & Cole, 
2002). Relatedly, thinking, feeling, and believing 
wholeheartedly that one is a child is not an easy 
task for an age regressed participant. Accordingly, 
a disruption in feeling like a child can account 
for the “adultlike” (i.e., “trance logic”) respond-
ing of certain “regressed” participants. Whereas 
age-regression calls for a reinstatement of child-
hood experience, the request to perform like an 
adult (e.g., write “big” words like “psychological”) 
may undermine participants’ involvement in the 
role called for by the suggestion. Consistent with 
this hypothesis, measures of response complete-
ness have been found to correlate negatively with 
incongruous writing (“adult” spelling) during age 
regression (Spanos et al., 1987), and real-simu-
lator differences are most consistently observed 
on indices (e.g., transparency of hallucination; 
incongruous writing, duality reports during age 
regression) where the criterion for trance logic 
involves responding to that suggestion in an in-
complete fashion (see Spanos, 1986; Stanley et al., 
1986 for reviews).
According to the incomplete responding ac-
count, it is not necessary to postulate constructs 
such as “trance logic” to explain the hypnotic or 
nonhypnotic experience of hypnotizable partici-
pants who spell “adult” words correctly during 
age regression.  From the participant’s perspec-
tive, “correct” spelling of words during age regres-
sion represents an active, constructive attempt 
to respond to suggestions.  Accordingly, the 
experience appears “incongruous” only from out-
side the framework of the participant’s phenom-
enal world (for a related argument see Sheehan & 
McConkey, 1982). 
 An alternate account of real-simulating dif-
ferences on trance logic measures (e.g., Stanley 
et al., 1986; Spanos, 1986; Spanos, deGroot, et al., 
1985; Spanos et al., 1987; Spanos & Radtke, 1981; 
Wagstaff, 1981, 1991) emphasizes the divergent in-
structional sets and task demands that real versus 
simulating participants encounter (see also Cox 
& Bryant, 2008). The central task of simulation 
is to avoid detection as a faker. Never having ex-
perienced hypnosis, simulators assume that sug-
gestible participants respond in a fully childlike 
manner (i.e. spell incorrectly) and therefore tend 
to not display trance logic. Thus, hypnotizable 
participants’ honest report of their incomplete 
involvement in the role or experience called for 
by the suggestion, combined with simulators role 
playing to convey “complete” responses, provides 
a plausible account of real-simulator differences.
In contrast to previous research using retro-
spective reports of involvment, we used handwrit-
ing to index role involvement.  If the participants 
with the most adult-like handwriting (incomplete 
involvement) are the most likely to spell words 
correctly during age regression (i.e., exhibit 
“trance logic”), it would provide support for the 
hypothesis that incomplete responding can ac-
count for “trance logic” behavior.  In contrast, if 
trance logic were based on complete responding 
to the age regression suggestion, we would expect 
that participants that exhibit the most child-like 
handwriting, would be most likely to spell words 
correctly (i.e., exhibit trance logic).
A second aim of this study was to examine 
the effect of the context in which the age regres-
sion suggestion is presented.  Whereas previ-
ous research (McConkey & Sheehan, 1980) has 
evaluated the cue-characteristics that augment or 
diminish “logical responding,” trance logic stud-
ies have not examined whether adult-like spell-
ing may be affected by whether the suggestion 
is worded in such a way as to facilitate a literal 
regression to childhood or a melding of fantasy 
and reality.  In the current study, we compared 
a standard age regression suggestion with a sug-
gestion to age regress in the context of a hypnotic 
dream. We hypothesized that the dream sugges-
tion would facilitate accurate spelling (i.e., trance 
logic), given that the contents of dreams are often 
contralogical and dreaming legitimizes “logical 
contradictions.” Because simulating participants 
would continue to view the spelling task as a test 
of their ability to age regress under either set of 
Trance logic 
The mixing of percep-
tions derived from reality 
with those that stem from 
imagination, ignoring both 
everyday logic and a need 
for logical consistency 
(Orne, 1959).
Age regression 
The response to a suggestion 
to re-live an earlier time in 
life such as childhood.
Imagining participant 
Individual who experiences 
imaginative suggestions 
administered in an “awake” 
context not associated with 
an hypnotic induction.
Simulator 
An individual  selected for 
low hypnotizability who is 
instructed to role-play the 
responses of an excellent 
hypnotic subject as a means 
of assessing experimental 
demand characteristics.
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suggestions, we predicted that the dream sug-
gestions would not facilitate simulators’ accurate 
spelling during age regression. 
Method
Participants
We screened approximately 950 participants 
(age range 18–25; median age  =  19) with the 
Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility 
(HGSHS:A, Shor & Orne, 1962) from the 
Psychology Department subject pool, and who 
volunteered for course credit, to obtain the ex-
perimental participants.  We selected hypnotiz-
able participants from a pool of 117 hypnotizable 
participants (HGSHS:A 10 and above) and simu-
lating participants were selected from a pool of 
93 unhypnotizable participants  (HGSHS:A 3 and 
below). To provide an even more stringent selec-
tion criterion, hypnotiizable participants were 
also required in the experimental session (see be-
low) to pass a visual hallucination suggestion to 
see a styrofoam cup by scoring a 2 or more on the 
5-point Likert-type scale, “To what extent were 
you able to see the second cup as a “lifelike” cup? 
Just like the real cup?” (1 = not at all; 3 = to some 
extent; 5 = to a great extent). 
Given that the study involved age regression, 
and was conducted in a group context, it was re-
quired that participants come from intact fami-
lies, and that both parents were living.  This was 
advertised on sign-up sheets, and announced as 
a requirement at the beginning of the screening 
and experimental sessions.   Participants who met 
these criteria all agreed to be contacted again in 
the first session for another part of the study and 
participated in a second experimental session, 
again for course credit.
 In order to test hypotheses pertinent to age 
regression and trance logic, it was also necessary 
to insure that hypnotizable participants truly ex-
perienced age regression.  Therefore additional re-
quirements for inclusion required were that par-
ticipants: (1) indicate they were 5-years-old when 
asked to write their age during age regression, and 
(2) evidence a minimal “child-like” handwriting 
change on a measure described below to unam-
biguously pass the suggestion.  Accordingly, only 
participants who met these minimal criteria were 
included in the analyses.  Fifty-four hypnotizable 
participants (HGSHS:A M = 10.69, S.D. = .80) met 
these criteria and the hallucination criterion, and 
49 simulating participants  (HGSHS:A M = 2.10, 
S.D. = .69) met these criteria.  All participants in-
dicated postexperimentally that a 5-year old could 
not spell the word “psychological” correctly (Yes/
No format).
Treatment of real and simulating 
participants
In the experimental session, the real and simu-
lating participants were treated identically, except 
the simulating participants were (prior to the age 
regression session) read instructions adapted 
from M.T. Orne (1971) and the project coordina-
tor conversed with susceptible participants about 
their previous hypnotic experience. Simulators 
were informed that when they participated in a 
second group hypnosis induction their task would 
be to convince the hypnotist that he/she was an 
excellent hypnotic subject capable of experienc-
ing deep hypnosis.  To properly motivate simula-
tors, they were informed that if the hypnotist at 
any time, for any reason, detected their deception 
he would tap them on the shoulder and excuse 
them from the experiment. So that simulators 
would not be able to identify the “real” co-par-
ticipants in the study, participants were informed 
that the instructions would be administered to 
other small groups of participants.  Participants 
(reals and simulators) were then led to another 
room where the experimental procedures were 
administered by a hypnotist blind to participants’ 
identity.  The hypnotist was not involved in the 
screening phase of the research.  
Hypnotic induction and sugges-
tions
Participants were tested in small groups  (5 – 10 
participants) and seated in such a way that pre-
vented observation of other participants’ writing. 
A second experimental assistant was present dur-
ing the experiment (also unaware of participants’ 
group assignment) to pass out forms and observe 
participants for any untoward reactions. The hyp-
notist administered the Stanford Profile Scale 
induction (Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1963) for 
hand and arm heaviness and eye closure, revised 
for group presentation. Deepening suggestions 
of walking down a spiral staircase were also used 
following the induction and after each suggestion. 
The following suggestions were then adminis-
tered, in a fixed order: (a) hands moving apart as 
a “warm up;”  (b) age regression; (c) positive hal-
lucination of a cup (see Stanley et al., 1986); (d) 
“countering” — participants received suggestions 
for hand levitation following an instruction to re-
sist responding (see Lynn, Nash, Rhue, Frauman, 
& Stanley, 1983).   After participants completed 
a postexperimental questionnaire, the assistant 
returned and the simulators ceased role-playing. 
Participants who wanted to talk about their ex-
perience of hypnosis were given an opportunity 
to do so. 
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Age regression tasks 
In both the “standard” and “dream” age regression 
suggestions, participants were told that the hyp-
notist would help them return to an earlier age 
(5).  Although participants received eye closure 
instructions previously, they were told that they 
would be asked to open their eyes and to write 
something down, but this would not disrupt their 
hypnosis or interfere with their ability to experi-
ence themselves as 5 years old (A pencil and pa-
per had been placed on each subject’s desk at the 
beginning of the experiment).  They also were in-
formed that they would always be able to hear the 
hypnotist and respond, even though they experi-
enced themselves as a child in a different circum-
stance. The suggestions for the dream condition 
closely paralleled the suggestions in the stan-
dard condition, except no allusion was made to 
a dream in the latter condition. More specifically, 
in the dream context, age regression was accom-
plished by informing participants that they could 
return to an earlier age by “having a dream about 
that time... a real dream... just the kind you have 
when you are asleep at night.”  The suggestion 
was framed in the context of sleep and dream-
ing throughout, and references to spelling were 
equated across dream and standard conditions.  
Counting was used to facilitate the intensity 
of the sleep and dream suggestions. In both con-
texts, suggestions for falling “even deeper asleep” 
preceded age regression to feel “safe, secure, and 
peaceful” as a 5-year-old, “seeing, hearing, tast-
ing, touching, sensing as a 5-year-old child, as 
you were when you were 5 years old, at home with 
your mother.  To be small again, to be very young, 
to have small hands and feet, to be young, and on 
this day feeling very secure, very comfortable, very 
much at ease, so good to be alive.”  Participants 
received counting from 5 to 1 to deepen and en-
hance the regression. When participants were 5 
years old, with their “Mommy,” they were told she 
had some words for them to spell.  
In the dream context, the suggestions re-
garding the dream were incorporated as follows: 
“Now you can dream about  (vs. experience) your 
mother asking you to spell something, dream 
now about (vs. experience) her asking you to 
spell — listen very carefully, very carefully to the 
words she says, words you can hear Mommy say-
ing to you, you can hear her asking you to spell 
these words, Mommy has some words for you to 
spell.  The words are “I am participating in a psy-
chological experiment”... spell these words, ‘I am 
participating in a psychological experiment’, for 
Mommy now on the piece of paper that is in front 
of you. You can do this without it disrupting your 
hypnotic dream (vs. experience of hypnosis) open 
your eyes just long enough to spell the words and 
to write down how old you are in your dream (vs. 
hypnosis) do this now, open your eyes, spell the 
words and write down how old you are in your 
dream (vs. hypnosis).” Following suggestions for 
eye closure, the age regression suggestion was ter-
minated by counting from 1 to 5, with suggestions 
to return fully to the present.  “Mommy” was the 
focal point of the age regression suggestions in 
order to facilitate the experience of regression 
and as a precaution against a negative experience.
Dependent measures 
The first measure of “trance logic” — the typical 
measure reported in the literature — was the cor-
rect spelling of the word psychological during 
age regression.  Because a more sensitive, con-
tinuous measure of correct spelling is desirable, 
we devised a second measure: (1) the “spelling” 
measure consisted of the sum of the three words 
“participating”, “psychological”, “experiment”; if 
participants substituted the word “hypnosis” for 
“psychological”, or “experiencing” for “participat-
ing”, they also received an index point for correct 
spelling.  The range of scores was 0-3.  Excellent 
interrater agreement rates were obtained for 
the spelling of the words “participating” (97%), 
“psychological” (95%), “experiment” (95%), 
“hypnosis” (100%), and “experiencing” (100%). 
Differences were resolved by discussion. Both 
raters were blind regarding the participants’ sta-
tus; one of the raters was blind to the hypotheses 
under consideration.  
 So that spelling and handwriting ratings 
would not be confounded, a separate set of raters 
rated handwriting changes, with subjects’ writing 
photocopied and any misspelled words whited 
out.   Handwriting changes were rated on a 0–3 
scale, with 0  =  no handwriting change (exclud-
ing the subject from inclusion in the analyses); 
1 = perceptible but small handwriting change with 
childlike characteristics (i.e., larger letters, use of 
printing); 2  =  pronounced handwriting change; 
3 = primitive, truly “regressed” writing (e.g., large, 
poorly formed letters, or block letters, barely leg-
ible childlike handwriting).  Handwriting was 
compared to prehypnotic samples based on re-
sponses to a demographic questionnaire, and to a 
posthypnotic questionnaire in which participants 
were asked to write about their thoughts, feelings, 
and actions in response to each of the sugges-
tions.  Raters were in perfect agreement on 83% 
of the ratings, and never differed by more than 1 
scale point. Raters’ scores were summed together. 
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Results
There was a moderate-strong relationship be-
tween adult-like handwriting and the number of 
words spelled correctly during age regression for 
both hypnotizable (r = .64, p < .001) and simulat-
ing (r  =  .59, p < .001) participants. None of the 
hypnotizable (n =12) or simulating participants 
(n = 19), in either the dream or the standard sug-
gestion groups, who evidenced an extreme score 
on the measure of childlike handwriting, spelled 
the word “psychological” correctly. 
Table 1 depicts the number of participants in 
the dream versus group context who spelled “psy-
chological” correctly vs. incorrectly.   We con-
ducted a backward elimination log-linear analy-
sis to examine whether there was an interaction 
between context (dream vs. standard) and group 
(hypnotizable vs. simulating participants) across 
the dichotomous measure of correct (i.e.,  trance 
logic) versus incorrect (i.e., not indicative of 
trance logic) spelling.  The best fitting model was 
the three-way interaction G2 (1) = 4.00, p =.046. 
To investigate the nature of this significant inter-
action, we conducted chi-square analyses.  
As predicted, chi-square analysis revealed 
that for hypnotizable participants, there was a 
greater frequency of correct (i.e., trance logic) 
spelling of psychological in the dream (54.54%) 
versus the standard (23.81%) context, whereas 
there was a higher frequency of incorrect (i.e., 
no trance logic) spelling in the standard (76.19%) 
than in the dream (45.45%) context, X2 (1) =4.96, 
p =.047, two tailed).  Moreover, although a great-
er frequency of hypnotizable participants spelled 
“psychological” correctly (i.e., trance logic) 
in the dream (54.54%) versus standard condi-
tion (23.81%), there was less variation across the 
dream (30.43%) and standard (38.46%) condi-
tions for the simulating participants, X2(1)=5.74, 
p=.024, two tailed). The means and standard de-
viations of the real and simulating participants in 
the dream and standard suggestion contexts for 
the continuous measure are presented in Table 
2.   Planned comparisons (two-tailed) were per-
formed on the continuous data and indicated that 
whereas hypnotizable participants in the dream 
context spelled more words correctly than hyp-
notizable participants in the standard context, 
simulators spelling remained stable across sug-
gestion contexts. The t values and significance 
levels are presented in Table 2.  Notably, an analy-
sis of variance (ANOVA) confirmed the presence 
of a significant interaction between suggestion 
context and hypnotizable-simulation codition, F 
(1,99)=4.73, p=.032, whereas no significant main 
effects for suggestion context, F (1,99) = 1.51, n.s., 
or participants (hypnotizable vs. simulator), F 
(1,99) <1, n.s. were evident.
Discussion
Our study is the first to show that behavior pur-
ported to index trance logic is vitiated in partici-
pants who exhibit a “complete” or fully childlike 
response to an age regression suggestion, in terms 
of handwriting change.   Not a single subject who 
met our most stringent criterion for responding 
to the age regression suggestion (i.e., primitive, 
childlike handwriting) spelled the word “psycho-
logical” correctly.  Furthermore, a moderately 
high correlation between incomplete respond-
ing to the age regression suggestion (adult-like 
handwriting) and correct spelling was secured. 
Thus, the participants who evinced the most role 
consistent response to an age regression sugges-
tion, were in fact the least likely to spell “adult” 
words correctly.  That a similar relationship held 
for simulating participants suggests that spelling 
words correctly during age regression is incom-
patible with enacting or experiencing the role of 
a truly “regressed” subject, and in this sense may 
reflect demand characteristics.
Our results provided confirmation of the hy-
pothesis that hypnotizable participants would be 
 
Table 1. Number of Participants/Condition Correctly and 
 Incorrectly Spelling “Psychological” 
 
 
 
 
 
Context 
 
 
Dream Standard 
 Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
Group     
Hypnotizables 18 15 5 16 
Simulators 7 16 10 16 
 
Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of the Measure of "Correct  
Spelling" (Sum of “Participating,” “Psychological,” “Experiment”) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: t-test (2-tailed) comparisons  
a versus b:  t (52) = 2.51, p = .016, d=0.68 
c versus d:  t (47) = -.66, n.s., d=0.19 
a versus c:  t (54) = 1.84, n.s., d=0.50 
b versus d:  t (45) = -1.26, n.s., d=0.37 
 
 
Context 
 
 
Dream Standard 
 M SD M SD 
Group     
Hypnotizables 1.91 a 1.33 1.05 b 1.19 
Simulators 1.26 c 1.25 1.50 d 1.27 
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affected by the context in which the age regression 
suggestion was delivered.  When the dream con-
text fostered a melding of fantasy and reality, hyp-
notizable participants were more likely to spell 
“adult” words correctly than when the standard 
suggestion context reinforced a more literal re-
gression to childhood.  Simulators’ performance 
remained stable across suggestion contexts, as 
expected.
Contrary to a number of studies (Perry & 
Walsh, 1978; Nogrady, McConkey, Laurence, 
& Perry, 1983; Spanos, et al., 1985), real-simula-
tor differences in correct spelling were not se-
cured — apart from the sensitivity of hypnotiz-
ables to the context manipulation — suggesting 
the possible influence of demand characteristics 
in shaping the responses of the hypnotizable 
participants.  Whereas research has not consis-
tently found evidence for more “adult” spelling 
on the part of reals versus simulators (McConkey 
& Sheehan, 1980; Peters, 1973; Stanley, Lynn, & 
Nash, 1986), methodological variations might ac-
count for disparate findings across studies.  For 
example, McConkey and Sheehan (1980) found 
that real-simulator differences were pronounced 
when the experimental procedures cued partici-
pants for “logical” (child-like) responses, relative 
to cues for illogical response (adult-like), when 
compared to a base condition in which no partic-
ular response was communicated as appropriate. 
The likelihood that we would find real-simulator 
differences might have been diminished because 
our methodology most resembled McConkey 
and Sheehan’s “illogical” condition, with relatively 
strong cues for adult-like spelling.  
We might have failed to secure differences be-
tween hypnotizable and simulating participants 
because testing simulators in a group format 
might have decreased involvement in the task of 
simulation.  Because the hypnotist was not able to 
clearly observe participants’ handwriting during 
the task, simulators’ perception of the hypnotist’s 
ability to penetrate their deceptions might have 
been compromised relative to simulators tested 
on an individual basis.   Although simulators gen-
erally adopt a response set marked by suspicion 
and caution (Sheehan, 1971; Spanos, 1986; Spanos 
et al., 1983; Spanos et al., 1985; Stanley et al., 1986) 
when the presence of the hypnotist looms large 
in individual testing, the group context may well 
decrease motivation to simulate and constrain 
the development of a conservative response set. 
Accordingly, caution should be exercised in in-
terpreting our findings regarding the lack of 
real-simulator differences: because we deviated 
from the standard real-simulator paradigm, our 
research should be considered exploratory in na-
ture.   We further suggest that future researchers 
incorporate both objective and subjective indica-
tions of involvement and absorption, in addition 
to more objective measures like those used in our 
study.  
Although our research relied on only a sin-
gle assessment of hypnotizability, we did select 
highly responsive participants required to pass 
a visual hallucination suggestion in addition to 
the suggestions on the hypnotizability scale.  In 
addition, previous trance logic research (Stanley 
et al., 1986) found no difference in the rates of 
responses to suggestions that indexed trance log-
ic — including age regression — when individuals 
were screened for hypnotizability on one or on 
two occasions, so long as individuals passed the 
criterion suggestion (e.g., indicated they were 
5-years-old following age regression suggestions). 
In closing, our findings provide preliminary sup-
port for the “incomplete responding hypothesis” 
and the idea that hypnotized participants’ seem-
ingly incongruous behavior is explicable in terms 
of participants’ motivated attempts to fulfill the 
cognitive and contextual requirements of the 
situation. 
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